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Abstract— This paper describes a strategy that was designed,
implemented, and presented at the Mobile Ad Hoc Networking
Interoperability and Cooperation (MANIAC) Challenge 2013. The
theme of the MANIAC Challenge 2013 was “Mobile Data
Offloading,” and consisted on developing and comparatively
evaluating strategies to offload infrastructure access points via
customer ad hoc forwarding using handheld devices (e.g., tablets
and smartphones). According to the challenge rules, a hop-by-hop
bidding contest (or “auction”) should decide the path of each data
packet towards its destination. Consequently, each team should
rely on other teams’ willingness to forward packets for them in
order to get their traffic across the network. In this application
scenario, the incentive for customers to join the ad hoc network
is discounted monthly fees, while operators should benefit from
decreased infrastructure costs. Following the rules of MANIAC
Challenge 2013, this paper proposes a strategy that is based
on the concept of how “tight” a node is to successfully deliver a
packet to its destination within a given deadline. This “tightness”
idea relies on a shortest-path analysis of the underlying network
graph, and it is used to define three sub-strategies that specify a)
how to participate in an auction; b) how to announce an auction;
and c) how to decide who wins the announced auction. The
proposed strategy seeks to minimize network resource utilization
and to promote cooperative behavior among participant nodes.
I. INTRODUCTION
The advent of mobile devices such as smartphones and
tablets have posed an unprecedent traffic demand on current
mobile communications infrastructure. For instance, AT&T
has reported that wireless data traffic has increased by
20,000% in just five years (2007-2012), and that an expo-
nential traffic increase should be expected in the years to
come [1]. Following similar reports, a number of operators
have started to look for alternative solutions to alleviate the
impact of the so-called “mobile data crunch” problem. As an
immediate (and partial) solution to this problem, many mobile
operators are currently deploying their own WiFi networks for
offloading their core network infrastructure by encouraging
their customers to switch to WiFi as much as possible.
Motivated by this timely and important issue, the organizers
of the Mobile Ad Hoc Networking Interoperability and Coop-
eration (MANIAC) Challenge 2013 [2] have called for the de-
velopment and comparative evaluation of strategies to offload
infrastructure access points via customer ad hoc forwarding
using handheld devices (e.g., smartphones and tablets). In
this year’s challenge, competing teams should come together
to form a wireless ad hoc network while simultaneously
connected to a backbone of access points. Then, traffic from
the backbone would be generated and destined to some other
backbone node. A hop-by-hop bidding contest should decide
the path of each data packet towards its destination, and each
team should rely on other teams’ willingness to forward traffic
for them in order to get their traffic across the network. In this
application scenario, the incentive for customers to participate
in the ad hoc network is discounted monthly fees, while
operators would benefit from decreased infrastructure costs.
Ultimately, the main goal of the MANIAC Challenge 2013 was
to demonstrate scenarios/strategies that do not degrade user
experience while offering significant mobile data offloading
on the infrastructure.
This paper presents a strategy that was designed, imple-
mented, and presented at the MANIAC Challenge 2013. The
main idea behind the proposed strategy is related to the
concept of how “tight” a node is to successfully deliver a
packet to its target destination within a given deadline. This
“tightness” concept is built upon a shortest-path analysis of
the underlying network graph, and it is used to define three
sub-strategies for participation in the ad hoc network: the
bidding strategy, which sets the bid for an auction based on
the budget, fine, timeout, and target destination announced by
the auctioneer; the budget-and-fine setup strategy, which sets
the budget and fine for every auction that is announced (in
case we need to forward a packet to someone else); and the
request-for-bids strategy, which decides who wins our auctions
based on received bids.
In addition, we have included another feature to the strategy
based on observed competitors’ behavior during the MANIAC
Challenge 2013. This additional feature seeks to promote
cooperation within the network by penalizing selfish or greedy
behavior. In fact, in order to convince other clients to join the
ad hoc network and share their handheld resources (bandwidth,
battery life, etc.), it is fundamental that every participant node
perceives some level of fairness and profit sharing within the
network in the long term. Otherwise, clients may not feel
encouraged to participate in the ad hoc network and, as a
result, they may decide to leave it or never join it. Such
an effect may compromise the feasibility of the proposed
offloading architecture due to severe network partitions and/or
poor geographical coverage.
The paper is divided as follows. Section II describes the
rules and setup of the MANIAC Challenge 2013. The proposed
strategy is described in Section III, and Section IV contais a
discussion about lessons we have learned from participation
in the challenge. Finally, Section V contains the conclusions.
II. MANIAC CHALLENGE 2013: RULES & SETUP
The general goal of the MANIAC Challenge is to better un-
derstand cooperation and interoperability in ad hoc networks.
Therefore, the main idea of the challenge is to put together
competing teams of students/researchers to form a wireless ad
hoc network, while simultaneously connected to a backbone
of access points. Figure 1 depicts a typical scenario, where
the lines connecting the devices indicate wireless connectivity,
and the green arrows indicate a path that would be taken by
a packet to traverse the ad hoc network from the AP source
to a target AP destination.
Fig. 1
MANIAC CHALLENGE 2013 SCENARIO: A WIRED BACKBONE OF WIFI
ACCESS POINTS AND A COLLECTION OF MOBILE HANDHELD DEVICES
WITH BACKBONE COVERAGE.
In the specific case of the MANIAC Challenge 2013, the
network setup consisted in the interconnection of the following
elements:
1) A wired backbone of WiFi access points (APs);
2) A collection of Google Nexus 7 tablets for the ad hoc
network.
Each team could compete with two tablets and, because
the tablets were Google Nexus 7, all strategies had to be
written for the Android Mobile OS. To help with strategy
implementation, the organizers have also made available the
“MANIAC framework,” which included an API that provided
function calls for “bidding” and “auction,” for sending and
receiving data, and for accessing topology and routing in-
formation through the Optimized Link-State Routing (OLSR)
protocol [3], [4]. In particular, the teams were allowed to
override the forwarding decisions made by the OLSR routing
protocol in order to implement their forwarding strategies in
the hop-by-hop bidding contests.
The competition was based on multiple rounds, where each
round consisted of multiple games. After each round, all
teams were allowed to refine their strategy. The organizers
monitored every packet launched to the network, and collected
statistical data to analyze each game and to identify nodes
that did not comply with the rules. Two winning categories
were defined for the challenge: performance, based on both
maximum balance above zero and highest packet delivery
ratio, and design, where a subjective evaluation would select
the most inspiring idea. In the following, we detail the rules
that were laid out for this year’s challenge.
A. Bidding
Each game starts with a randomly selected backbone access
point (AP) initiating a forwarding request to deliver one data
packet to another randomly selected AP. In each bidding
request, the source AP indicates:
• Maximum budget available for the successful delivery of
the data packet;
• Maximum packet delivery time (i.e., “timeout”) translated
to a maximum number of hops that the particular packet
could traverse;
• A fine to be paid in case of unsuccessful packet delivery
to its destination.
All neighbors that are able to overhear a bidding request are
obligated to bid their price lower or equal than the announced
budget to forward the data packet. All bids are open, in the
sense that they can be detected and understood by anyone
within range of the node that sent the bid. After sending a
bidding request, every auctioneer must wait for 3 s before
broadcasting the auction winner. The initial upstream node
(i.e., the AP source) always selects the bid with the lowest
cost. From this point on, per packet hop-by-hop recursive
auctions should be performed in order to decide each data
packet’s next hop towards destination. Each handheld device
must deliver the packet to the destination either via the ad
hoc network or the provider’s infrastructure backbone based
on independent bidding. Using the backbone for delivery
guarantees a 100% packet delivery ratio. Each backbone node
is reachable within radio range of at least one handheld, and
the handheld topology is not partitioned. Handheld devices
are free to advertise their own maximum budget and fine in
their bidding requests, except for the timeout, which has to
be the same as the one set by the source AP. However, in
all auctions, the advertised fine should be smaller or equal to
the fine agreed upon for the previous hop. After receiving the
bids, the handheld device can choose a winner downstream
node based on its own strategy. A node that wins an auction
is allowed to drop the packet it has just received based on its
own strategy. In order to avoid loops, a handheld device is not
allowed to bid for a data packet it has already forwarded once.
B. Payment
An upstream node pays the accepted price to the chosen
downstream node if the packet has been delivered successfully
to the final destination. If the data packet does not make it
to the backbone destination before the timeout, the chosen
downstream node must pay the agreed fine to the upstream
node. As mentioned before, the initial data packet budget, the
associated fine, and timeout are predefined, per packet, by the
organizers. In all auctions, the fine must be smaller or equal
to the budget defined in the bidding request. A handheld’s
balance may be temporarily negative. A handheld that bypass
the ad hoc network by using the backbone must pay a price
equal to the initial maximum data packet budget (when the
data packet was first introduced in the network). The fine has
to be paid in case of unsuccessful packet delivery (i.e., packet
loss or exceeding the packet delivery time).
III. THE PROPOSED STRATEGY
In this section, we define the proposed strategy, which com-
prises three sub-strategies: the bidding strategy, the budget-
and-fine setup strategy, and the request-for-bids setup strategy.
Before going into details about each sub-strategy, we explain
the nomenclature and definitions used in this work.
A. Nomenclature and Definitions
When the source access point (AP) announces its request
for bids (RFB), it announces its budget B0, along with a
fine F0 to be paid in case the data packet is not delivered
to the destination AP after traversing a maximum number H0
of hops (i.e., this is the “timeout” announced by the source
AP, as mentioned before). Let hci denote the number of hops
(or “hop count”) of the shortest path (in terms of number of
hops) computed from node i to the destination AP. Also, let
pk denote the number of hops traversed by a packet from the
source AP to a given node k in the network.
A key metric in our proposal is the definition of a “tightness
function” ∆i for a node i in the network, i.e., ∆i measures
how “tight” a node i is with respect to making the deadline
H0 imposed by the source AP. More specifically, given the
timeout H0 announced by the source AP, and the number pu
of hops already traversed by the data packet all the way to node
i’s upstream node u (i.e., node i’s predecessor, the one who
will issue an RFB), ∆i measures the “surplus” or “deficit” (in
number of hops) that node i possess with respect to timeout
H0 if the data packet were forwarded through its shortest path
to the destination AP, given by
∆i = (H0 − pu − 1)− hci, ∀i ∈ N (u), (1)
where N (u) is the set of nodes who are able to overhear
the RFB from node u, i.e., the neighbors of node u. The
computation of ∆i requires the knowledge of the underlying
network topology (the OLSR routing protocol provides that),
and the use of any shortest path algorithm. Notice that, if
∆i < 0, node i cannot deliver the data packet within the
deadline (even if the data packet follows node i’s shortest path
to the destination AP). On the other hand, if ∆i = 0, node i
needs exactly the number of hops contained in its shortest path
to the destinatio AP in order to make the deadline. This is a
“tight” situation for node i, since it relies on the unpredicted
outcome of other downstream auctions for the packet to arrive
within the deadline. Finally, if ∆i > 0, node i has a higher
chance to deliver the data packet within the deadline because
the packet may even deviate from its shortest path to the
destination AP, but it has a “surplus” of hops before the
deadline is up.
B. The Bidding Strategy
The bidding strategy defines how the value of the bid is
set once an RFB is overheard from an upstream node u. For
that, we first need to determine the set N (u) of neighbors
of the upstream node u. This set contains our competitors in
the upcoming auction, and it can be easily found because all
nodes have complete knowledge of the network topology. For
each node i ∈ N (u), we compute ∆i according to Eq. (1).
Based on the values of ∆i, we create a subset S(u) ⊆ N (u)
that contains all nodes in N (u) such that ∆i ≥ 0, i.e., the set
S(u) contains all nodes that are actually able to deliver the
packet within the deadline and, therefore, they are the ones
most likely to win the auction announced by node u (our actual
competitors). Observe that, we are assuming that node u will
usually prefer not to pay a fine.
Given S(u), we want to estimate how competitive we are
in terms of packet delivery from the point of view of node u.
It is reasonable to expect that the likelihood of successfully
delivering a packet will play a key role in any decision making
by any node. Therefore, we choose to find out how competitive
we are by using our “tightness function.” Specifically, we
compute how “tight” we are with respect to the average
tightness ∆ of nodes in S(u), defined as
∆ =
1
|S(u)|
∑
i∈S(u)
(H0 − pu − 1)− hci
= (H0 − pu − 1)− hc, (2)
where |S(u)| is the cardinality of S(u), and hc is the average
optimal hop count over all i ∈ S(u), i.e., the average shortest
path to the destination AP computed for each node i ∈ S(u).
Once the average tightness ∆ is found, we can compute our
relative tightness cn with respect to ∆ by
cn =
∆n
∆
=
(H0 − pu − 1)− hcn
(H0 − pu − 1)− hc
, (3)
where the subscript n is used to identify ourselves. It is
important to mention that the above computation will only
happen if our tightness function is such that ∆n > 0 and
|S(u)| > 0. Otherwise, we have specific rules for making our
bid (explained later).
Observe that, if cn < 1 and ∆n > 0, our competitors are
better positioned than us (on average, with respect to a surplus
of hop counts). Therefore, there is a high chance that they
become more aggressive to win the bidding, since they may
feel that they can deliver the packet in time. At the same
time, since cn < 1, it means that we are running a higher
risk on not having the packet delivered to its final destination,
compared to others. Therefore, we may want to set a higher
bid (closer to the budget Bu) because the risk should not be
worth it to take. In case cn ≈ 1, we have similar conditions
than other competitors and, therefore, we should try to win the
auction with a lower bid compared to previous case. However,
if cn > 1, it means that we are better positioned than the
average of our competitors. Therefore, we should strive to win
the bid by offering a very attractive price (closer to the fine
Fu).
In additon to cn, another important metric to take into
account is how ∆n (the value of our tightness function)
compares to the highest value of ∆i for i ∈ S(u). This is
because, if ∆n > maxi∈S(u)∆i = ∆max, it means that we
are the best choice for the upstream node u in terms of a
positive surplus of hop counts towards destination. Therefore,
we should strive to win the auction by becoming as aggressive
as possible in our bid (i.e., to set lower values for the bid to
make sure we win the auction). Otherwise, if ∆n << ∆max,
we should have very low expectations to win the auction and,
therefore, we should not make dramatic changes in our bid for
different values of cn. Based on that, we define the parameter
an that compares our tightness value with the best tightness
value in S(u), i.e.,
an =
∆n
∆max
. (4)
Given the values of the budget Bu and the fine Fu an-
nounced by the upstream node u, and since Fu ≤ Bu
(according to auction rules), our offered bid O(cn), will be
given by a logistic function of the form
O(cn) = (Bu − Fu)
[
1−
1
1 + e−an(cn−1)
]
+ Fu, (5)
where Fu ≤ O(cn) ≤ Bu, i.e., we opt for never making a
bid less than the established fine Fu. As it can be seen, the
logistic function is centered on cn = 1, and the steepness of
the curve is controlled by an.
Finally, if ∆n < 0, we discourage the upstream node
from choosing us by setting our bid equal to the budget Bu.
Likewise, if there is no competition, i.e., we are the only
node reachable by the upstream node, we set our bid to the
maximum value Bu, and if ∆n = 0, it means that we are very
“tight” and, therefore, we should set our bid to Bu (high risk).
Figure 2 shows examples of offered bid curves for different
valus of an and cn.
Lastly, we define a random instant of time ts in which we
transmit our (mandatory) bid for a given advertised RFB. This
is because, according to the auction’s rules, there is an auction
timeout (AT ) before which everyone who gets an RFB must
(mandatorily) transmit its bid. Hence, in order to diminish
the chances of having competing nodes that always hear our
bids before formulating their own ones (e.g., “sniper-type” of
behavior at the closing of an auction), we select a random
instant of time ts that is uniformly chosen in the interval
[0.5AT, 0.75AT ] to transmit our bid.
C. Budget-and-Fine Setup Strategy
Once an auction is won, the strategy to set the budget Bn
and fine Fn to be announced on an RFB is based on a fixed
rule. Given that the upstream node paid us an amount equal
to our winner offer O∗, the budget Bn and fine Fn will be set
to
Bn = 0.6×O
∗ and Fn = 0.9×Bn, (6)
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EXAMPLE OF OFFERED BID CURVES O(cn) FOR DIFFERENT VALUES OF
THE PARAMETER an WHEN Bu = 200 AND Fu = 80.
where the value of 60% and 90% were estimated to be
reasonable values that can afford, from time to time, some
loss not so high (according to auction rules).
D. Request-for-Bids Setup Strategy
In order to determine who wins our RFB, we want to
consider both the offered price opi and the relative tightness
ci of each neighbor i around us (except for the upstream node
from whom we received the packet). Based on those values, we
want to determine the best neighbor to foward our packet to.
The maximum offered price we can receive is our own budget
Bn, and the maximum relative tightness cmax is related to the
neighbor with the highest tightness value ∆i. In our strategy,
we value a high relative tightness more than a good offered
price, since we want to guarantee packet delivery as much as
possible. Therefore, we need to define a preference function
Pn(ci, opi) that translates our preference towards the received
bids. Hence, the lowest preference would be given to the node
that has ci = 0 and opi = Bn, i.e., Pn(0, Bn) = 0. On the
hand, the highest preference would be given to the one where
ci = cmax and opi = 0 (for free). Other interesting cases are
Pn(0, 0), where it reflects the case when the node is “tight,”
but it has offered “free forward”, and the case Pn(Bn, cmax)
where the node has offered the maximum bid, but it is the best
node. If Pn(0, 0) = k1 and Pn(Bn, cmax) = k2, we may set
k2 > k1 > 0 to reflect our tendency to favor packet delivery
as opposed to earn money. The absolute values k1 and k2 are
not important, but their relative magnitudes should translate
our relative preference between those scenarios (adjustable
according to the game). The equation of a plane that intersects
those points can be obtained so that the preference function
Pn(ci, opi) is finally defined as
Pn(opi, ci) = k1 −
(
k1
Bn
)
opi +
(
k2
cmax
)
ci (7)
Figure 3 depicts the case for the hypotetical values Bn = 20,
cmax = 3, and k1 = 2, and k2 = 3.
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EXAMPLE OF PREFERENCE FUNCTION FOR THE VALUES Bn = 20,
cmax = 3, k1 = 2, AND k2 = 3
E. Strategy Extension: Promoting Cooperative Behavior
The original strategy was supplemented with an additional
feature as a result of observed competitors’ behavior during
the MANIAC Challenge event. In fact, considering that i)
performance criteria was based on packet delivery ratio and
maximum balance above zero, and ii) challenge rules enforced
the sending of a bid by every node that could hear an RFB,
it was possible to have a situation where the auctioneer could
actually announce an RFB with zero budget and, yet, to have
his packet disputed by every node in its neigborhood. Hence,
in spite of not providing any monetary incentives for other
nodes to forward his packet, every single neighbor was forced
to participate in a zero-budget auction because of competition
rules. Thus, with a zero-budget auction, the auctioneer could
make a significant profit based on free work provided by
downstream nodes. For instance, the auctioneer could retain all
budget he might have received from an upstream node while,
at the same time, to have his packet delivered by downstream
nodes for free.
Considering that one of the main goals of MANIAC
Challenge 2013 was to find ways of promoting mobile data
offloading via customer ad hoc forwarding using handheld
devices, and given that customers may not be willing to share
their resources if no incentives are given, greedy strategies
such as this may actually work against the feasibility of ad hoc
networks as a solution to the offloading problem. In fact, if a
significant portion of participant nodes adopt greedy strategies,
other nodes may realize that it is not worth it to forward
someone’s else traffic. Consequently, many nodes may leave
the ad hoc network, which may cause severe network partitions
and compromise the own existence of the network. Therefore,
it is important to discourage anyone from performing such
practices by signaling, somehow, that such strategies are not
acceptable and they are hurtful to the well-being of the
network as a whole. Instead, a cooperative behavior should
be promoted among nodes, by allowing everyone to obtain
some benefit out of their participation in the ad hoc network.
With that goal in mind, we have added another rule as a
follow-up to our bidding strategy: it states that if a request for
bids with zero budget is announced, and our zero-valued bid
(according to Eq. (5)) is chosen as the winner of the auction,
the received packet is immediately dropped after its reception.
Notice that, since the announced fine is necessarily zero (it
cannot exceed the budget and it must be nonnegative), we do
not loose any money by not forwarding the received packet.
Moreover, by dropping the received packet, we not only
frustrate the “work-for-free” strategy set up by the auctioneer,
but also force it to pay any fine he has agreed upon with any
upstream node. In addition, the resulting “cascade effect” on
fine payment imposed on the auctioneer’s upstream nodes may
cause them to avoid this node as a relay in future auctions.
By doing so, we expect that the more nodes discourage such
behavior, the less are the chances of having someone acting in
a greedy manner. This rule is a way of signaling greedy nodes
that they must change their way of announcing RFBs in order
to promote a more cooperative behavior and better sharing of
resources and monetary gains.
IV. LESSONS LEARNED & DISCUSSION
A number of lessons can be drawn from the participation in
the MANIAC Challenge 2013, especially regarding the use of
of off-the-shelf tablets and/or smartphones in the deployment
of ad hoc networks for purposes of infrastructure offloading
through auction-based forwarding schemes.
A. MAC and Routing Protocols
As far as the adoption of tablets and/or smartphones for
the deployment of ad hoc networks is concerned, a number of
issues still need to be addressed in order to have these devices
fully functional for a lasting and reliable multi-hop ad hoc op-
eration. Today, practically all tablets and smartphones support
the IEEE 802.11 a/b/g/n. However, in spite of supporting WiFi,
the Android platform does not officially support its ad hoc
mode of operation, and off-the-shelf tablets/smartphones can
only operate in infrastructure mode by default. Therefore, as
of this writing, there is still the need to resort to command line
hacking in order to have the ad hoc mode of operation working
on Android-based devices. This is unfortunately different
between different devices and ROMS. This lack of support for
ad hoc mode does not only impact the operation at the medium
access control (MAC) sub-layer, but also impacts the instal-
lation and operation of the routing protocol. As mentioned
before, the MANIAC Challenge 2013 has adopted the OLSR
as the routing protocol for ad hoc networking. In particular,
they have adopted the OLSRd [4] implementation for Android
platform. In addition to having to undergo the same installation
issues mentioned before, the OLSRd implementation does not
provide any enhancements regarding energy efficiency. OLSR
is a proactive, table-driven routing protocol that constantly
broadcasts topology and other control information to the
entire network. In spite of using a clever idea of choosing
a subset of nodes to propagate broadcast information—the
multipoint relays (MPRs)—its original design did not target
energy efficiency [5], [6], [7], [8]. Hence, in order to have a
lasting and efficient ad hoc operation for offloading purposes,
the energy efficiency of the underlying routing protocol must
be urgently addressed. Last, but not least, a major problem
that has also been found was incompatible WiFi drivers that
led to incorrect behavior between end devices [9].
B. The Issue of Timeouts
In the MANIAC Challenge 2013, timeouts were announced
in terms of maximum number of hops to destination, as
opposed to an actual time value. With this definition, it is
implicit that the backbone itself translates the maximum time
allowed to deliver a packet to its destination into a maximum
number of hops that a packet can traverse across the ad hoc
network to its destination. As a result, our “tightness” concept
was built around that specific definition. In another possible
scenario, the backbone would simply announce an actual time
value as the deadline. If that were the case, we would need
to modify our strategy accordingly. This means that, instead
of computing the “surplus” or “deficit” of hops through the
shortest path to destination from a given node i (tightness
function ∆i in Section III), we would need to find out the
remaining time through the path with the shortest delay from a
node i. Consequently, a significant modification to our strategy
would be needed, since it would require the estimation of delay
over different paths. This is not an easy task, and it would
require an estimation technique that is simple, fast, and able
to deliver accurate results.
C. Cooperative versus Selfish Behavior
The issue of cooperation is critical in order to make data
offloading feasible with auction-based forwarding schemes in
ad hoc networks. Eventually, every node wants to receive some
share of the budget offered by the backbone. Otherwise, there
will be no point in participating in the ad hoc network. In
fact, it is reasonable to expect that some node(s) may end up
receiving more than others as a result of their strategies, but
some fraction of their gains should be shared among everyone
(at least in the long run). Therefore, it is key that every
participant node perceives some level of fairness and “profit
sharing” within the network. To accomplish that, announced
auctions should be as attractive as possible, so that nodes keep
motivated to join and participate in the ad hoc network. On the
other hand, whenever possible, nodes should strive to punish
those nodes that act in an unfair manner or uncooperatively.
One such technique for that is the one we have implemented
in our strategy.
D. Need for Large-Scale Performance Evaluations
The MANIAC Challenge 2013 was a very rich experience,
and it has put together very different and creative strategies to
compete under the proposed offloading architecture. However,
because the network comprised 12 tablets only (including a
pair of “dummy” tablets), and the event lasted a single day,
it was not possible to carry out a thorough investigation on
scalability issues, for instance. In fact, while the introduction
of more nodes would certainly improve geographical coverage
and provide higher path redundancy (i.e., fault tolerance), it
might as well degrade link quality and network delay due
to channel contention and higher interference. Therefore, it
would be interesting to observe the behavior of the offloading
architecture under significant traffic load and higher degree
of interaction. Moreover, apart from the network itself, it
also remains unclear how individual strategies would perform
under such circumstances. Therefore, there is a clear need
for a thorough, large-scale performance evaluation of such
auction-based forwarding schemes for data offloading. Such
evaluations would be instrumental for assessing the actual
feasibility of mobile data offloading through wireles ad hoc
networks.
V. CONCLUSIONS
As demonstrated by the MANIAC Challenge 2013, there are
many issues still to be addressed before mobile data offloading
through wireless ad hoc networks becomes a viable and
functional solution across many devices and mobile operating
systems. However, the richness of application scenarios and
the creativity of solutions presented at the event suggest that
wireless ad hoc networks may help to not only offload the
operator’s infrastructure, but also to provide smart data pricing
schemes and extended wireless coverage.
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